EDITORIAL:
Adequacy Cases are Alive and Well
For the past 18 years, plaintiffs in education adequacy
litigations have had a remarkable record of success,
prevailing in 20 of 27 decisions of the states’
highest courts (or unappealed trial court decisions).
Al Lindseth, an attorney who has represented the defendants
in some of these cases, claimed in a recent commentary
in Education Week and in his answer
to critical letters from me
and from others,
that in the past two years, there has been “a
dramatic shift in the courts’ attitude toward
such lawsuits,” and that since that time, “plaintiffs
have lost or been disappointed in 14 of the last 15
adequacy decisions.”
An examination of the 15 cases Lindseth cites shows
that his conclusions are unwarranted and totally misleading.
Lindseth acknowledges that plaintiffs prevailed in New
Hampshire. Let’s examine the remaining fourteen
cases in detail. They fall in to three categories:
- Six trial court cases, stayed or on appeal.
- Five follow up decisions to major rulings
- Three unique rulings
The Six Cases Stayed or On Appeal
These are the trial trial court decisions in Alaska,
Colorado, Indiana, Missouri, Oregon, and South Carolina.
In two of these cases, plaintiffs have, in fact, won
path-breaking victories.
1) The South Carolina court held
that students from poverty backgrounds were constitutionally
entitled to pre-school through third-grade programs
and services
2) The Alaska Court determined
that “the State has violated the Education Clause”
because it “has failed to identify those schools
that are not according to children a meaningful opportunity”
and has failed to provide “a concerted effort
to remedy that situation.”
3), 4), 5), 6) Some, if not all, of the other trial
court decisions in which plaintiffs did not prevail
(Colorado, Indiana, Missouri, Oregon)
may well be overturned by the states’ Supreme
Courts. The general pattern in adequacy cases has
been that findings for plaintiffs involving major
new constitutional interpretations often can come
only from the state’s highest court.
The Five Follow-Up Decisions
These five are follow-up decisions of major rulings
in which the states’ highest courts had previously
strongly upheld children’s constitutional rights
to an adequate education: Kentucky, Massachusetts, New
York, Texas and Wyoming.
7) The New York Court of Appeals
re-affirmed its constitutional holding and ordered
the State to expend at least $2 billion on a remedy
for New York City’s school children. Although
this “constitutional minimum” was less
than the $5 billion figure recommended by the lower
courts, the legislature, in fact, responded to the
Court’s order by adopting funding reforms that
reflected the $5 billion figure endorsed by the lower
court.
8) The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, noting that the State had implemented the extensive
reforms contemplated by its previous order, had increased
education spending by over $6.5 billion, and had achieved
remarkable progress in terms of academic improvement
in recent years, declined to issue a further order
to deal with the continuing problems in certain poor
and minority districts, expressing an expectation
that the legislature would continue its efforts to
deal with these remaining problems.
9) Similarly, the trial court in Kentucky,
citing “substantial progress” toward meeting
the state’s education goals, was unwilling “at
this time” to order additional funding, but
it explicitly left open the possibility of future
relief if further evidence of inadequacy is presented.
10) The Texas Supreme Court’s
latest decision actually struck down the state's current
school funding system, which had been reformed in
response to the courts’ previous orders, after
finding that the system had evolved into an unconstitutional
state property tax. Although it reversed the trial
court’s finding that the system was currently
failing to provide an “adequate, suitable and
efficient” education, the Supreme Court noted
that “it remains to be seen whether the system's
predicted drift toward constitutional inadequacy will
be avoided by legislative reaction to widespread calls
for changes.”
11) In Wyoming, the trial court
declared that some elements of the school funding
system were unconstitutional, including those related
to school facilities and seniority adjustments for
teachers, but it dismissed plaintiffs’ claims
for additional at-risk program aid and for pre-school
funding.
Since plaintiffs always aim high, there is no doubt
that in some of these compliance cases they have been
“disappointed” by the courts’ responses
to their requests for further relief. Most significant,
however, is the fact that in each of these cases, the
state’s highest court re-affirmed students’
rights to a basic, quality education and made clear
its expectation that the State would continue to take
affirmative steps to meet the needs of students who
were still not being properly served. The detailed court
findings of extensive education progress due to implementation
of remedies in earlier adequacy litigations also should
remind all of us that these cases have been enormously
successful in closing opportunity gaps and raising achievement.
Three Unique Cases
This leaves only three (Arizona, Nebraska and Oklahoma)
of the fifteen cases cited by Lindseth in which plaintiffs
actually lost basic constitutional rulings by the state’s
highest court.
12) The Arizona case, however, was
not a classical “adequacy” litigation;
it sought to break new ground in establishing new
affirmative constitutional rights of children “at
risk.” The Arizona Supreme Court declined to
do so, but, it in no way went back on its previous
strong rulings regarding students’ constitutional
rights to adequate educational facilities.
13), and 14) In the Nebraska and
Oklahoma rulings, state supreme courts
that had previously refused to consider challenges
to the state’s education finance system, refused
to do so again, holding that these allegations raised
“political questions” that should be resolved
by legislatures and not courts.
In sum, a review of the recent cases cited by Lindseth
indicates not that “courts have cooled to adequacy
lawsuits,” but that the adequacy movement has
matured and that, in many states, courts are facing
complex implementation and compliance issues that require
new thinking and new approaches by both litigants and
judges.
Despite what Lindseth says or would like to believe,
most of the courts are re-affirming their commitment
to upholding children’s constitutional rights
to an adequate education. They are also indicating that
at advanced compliance stages of these proceedings,
new ways for courts to communicate and to cooperate
with the legislative and executive branches must be
forged.
The questions raised by the courts in these “second
generation cases” call for thoughtful responses
and nuanced solutions, rather than the quick sound bites
in which Lindseth deals.
These sophisticated questions of how courts should
define and ensure success at the remedial stages of
education adequacy litigations, and how the three branches
of government can better work together to promote meaningful
educational opportunity for all children will be among
the major issues explored in depth at the forthcoming
Symposium entitled “Equal
Educational Opportunity: What Now?” sponsored
by the Campaign for Educational Equity at Teachers College,
Columbia University and Columbia Law School on November
12, and 13, 2007.
Prepared by Michael A. Rebell, October 26, 2007
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