NJ SUPREME COURT INVALIDATES STATE BUDGET CUTS

In a stunning rebuke to Governor Chris Christie’s attempt to reduce educational expenditures because of state budget deficits, the New Jersey Supreme Court held last week that funding for the 31 Abbott districts in FY 2012 must be provided at the full level called for in the state’s School Funding reform Act of 2008 ( SFRA). This would provide an estimated $500 million increase over current funding levels for these districts. [Click here for full text of decision.] The Court stated in no uncertain terms that “Like anyone else, the State is not free to walk away from judicial orders enforcing constitutional obligations.”

The plaintiffs in Abbott v. Burke had initiated this case last June when they filed a motion requesting the state’s high court to block implementation of the 2010-2011 budget because it failed to fund schools at the levels required by the 2008 School Funding Reform Act (SFRA). Governor Christie and the state legislature had adopted an austerity budget that cut education funding by 13.6%. Plaintiffs' main claim was that the state had violated the condition the court had laid down in its decision approving the new formula in 2009, i.e. that the formula be fully funded.

In January, 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the case to Judge Peter Doyle, sitting as a special master, to hear evidence on these issues. In March, Judge Doyle issued a report concluding that as a result of $1.6 billion dollars in budget cuts, large numbers of students throughout the state were being denied the “thorough and efficient education” required by the state’s constitution. He found that despite the State’s best efforts, the reductions fell more heavily upon high need districts and the children educated within those districts.

Now, by a 3-2 majority, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the state had breached the key premises underlying the Court’s 2009 Order, which had approved the new SFRA (over the plaintiffs’ objections at that time.) In asking for the Court to approve the formula and terminate other outstanding compliance orders in the Abbott case, the Attorney General, had assured the Court that the state could fully fund the new formula and suggested that full funding be made a condition of the court’s approval. Citing those assurances, the Court held in its recent order that:

Our grant of relief was clear and it was exacting: It came with express mandates. We required full funding, and a retooling of the SFRA’s formula’s parts, at the designated mileposts in the formula’s implementation. When we granted the State the relief it requested, this Court did not authorize the State to replace the parity remedy with some underfunded version of the SFRA

.
One of the members of the majority wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that he would have required the State to fully fund the formula for all districts in the state, based on the special master’s express finding that children throughout the state, and not just in the Abbott districts, were being denied a thorough and efficient education, and that the SFRA purported to provide a constitutional level of funding for all students.  The other two members of the majority held, however, that the Court’s jurisdiction was limited to the 31 Abbott districts and that its order, therefore, would extend only to them. The Education Law Center, attorneys for the plaintiffs, had requested state-wide relief and indicated that they would continue to press the legislature to fully fund the SFRA for all districts and not just the Abbott districts.

Two justices dissented on the grounds that 1) on a major compliance motion of this type, a majority of the entire court ( i.e. at least 4 justices) must support the decision; [ The chief justice and one other justice had recused themselves from taking part in this decision]; and 2) there is insufficient support for the Special Master’s findings that the reduction in funding of the SFRA has prevented districts from delivering a constitutionally adequate education; and 3) the relief requested usurps the constitutional prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches.